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ARGUMENT
I.

EVEN WITH THE STATE'S MISREPRESENTATIONS AND
OMISSIONS,
THE
EVIDENCE,
AS
MARSHALED,
IS
INSUFFICIENT
TO
SUPPORT
THE
TRIAL
COURT'S
DETERMINATION THAT MR. POWELL KNOWINGLY AND
INTENTIONALLY POSSESSED THE FIREARM.

The State argues that the evidence was sufficient to convict
Mr. Powell for illegal possession of a firearm.
Appellee, pp. 8-13.
demonstrated

below,

See Brief of

In the course of its argument, the State, as
misrepresents

and

omits

various

Powell

had

knowledge

critical

facts.
The

State

argues

firearm's presence

that

Mr.

because his cigarette

of

the

rolling papers were

located in the same backpack as Ms. Shannon Stewart's firearm.
By so arguing, the State implies that the firearm was in plain
view and easily accessible.

Contrary to the State's assertions,

Ms. Stewart's firearm was neither in plain sight nor was it easily
accessible (See R. 93, p. 12, lines 7-25).

Rather, Ms. Stewart's

firearm was located in a separate zippered, self-contained, blackcolored fanny pack inside its own shoulder-strap holster, which,
in turn, was located in the M a r k colored back pack." (See
The State, in its Brief, makes little effort to cite to
Vo Layman,

id.).
State

1999 UT 79, 985 P. 2d 911, which is the Utah Supreme

Court's most recent pronouncement concerning the legal principles
of

constructive

possession.

In
4

Layman,

the

defendant

was

convicted of a drug possession charge on a theory of constructive
possession.

Like this case, the evidence presented against the

defendant was circumstantial.

Among other things, when the woman

the drugs in Layman

who actually possessed

was asked by the

officer if he could see the pouch, which he later found to contain
the illegal substance, she looked at the defendant and he "shook
his head in a negative fashion for an unspecified length of time.'7
Id.

at

f8.

Affirming

this

court's

reversal

of

Layman's

conviction, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the evidence was
legally

insufficient

to

warrant
Id.

constructive possession.

drawing

at ifl6.

an

inference

of

The Court stated:

We conclude that the court of appeals
properly found the evidence in this case is
insufficient. When all the brush is cleared,
the critical fact is that there was little
evidence to prove that Michael had such
control over Gina's person that one could
reasonably infer beyond a reasonable doubt
that he knowingly and intentionally possessed
the drugs and paraphernalia in her pouch.
The only fact tending to prove Michael's
control over Gina is that she looked at him
when the deputy requested to see the pouch
and that Michael shook his head in a negative

fashion.
Id.

This

simply

is not

enough.

(emphasis added).
The

Court

requirement

in Layman

that

to

both

prove

reaffirmed

constructive

and

solidified

possession,

w

it

the
is

necessary that xthere [be] a sufficient nexus between the accused

5

and the [item allegedly possessed] to permit an inference that the
accused had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and
control . . . .'"

Id.

at fl3 (quoting State v.

319 (Utah 1985)); see also

United

States

549 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing United
1403, 1431 (10th Cir. 1990) J.1

v.

States

Fox,

Mills,
v.

709 P.2d 316,
29 F.3d 545,

Sullivan,

919 F.2d

Moreover, there must be facts that

show the accused intended to use the allegedly possessed item,
which in this case is the firearm, as his own.

See id.2

The

State must prove the elements of constructive possession beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In

the

See id.

instant

at ffl2 and 16.

case,

the

State

had

to prove

beyond

a

reasonable doubt that the firearm was subject to Mr. Powell's

1

In the course of discussing the type of nexus referred to in
State v. Layman,
1999 UT 79, fl3, 985 P.2d 911, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that the State
cannot rest its case on "the mere circumstance that a defendant was
close to or had access to the illegal items;" rather "there must be
xx
some action, some word, or some conduct that links the individual
to the [illegal items] and indicates that he had some stake in the
them, some power over them.'7" United States
v. Ford, 993 F.2d 249,
252 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting United States
v. Foster,
783 F.2d 1087,
1089 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting United States
v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535,
549 (D.C. Cir. 1980)) .
2

In State v. Layman,
1999 UT 79, 985 P. 2d 911, the Court
recognized that the determination concerning the existence of a
sufficient nexus for constructive possession is a "highly factsensitive determination."
Id. at fl4. The Court also noted that
while the different factors listed in previous cases might be of help
in guiding the fact finder, "[t]hey are not universally pertinent
factors, and they are not legal elements of constructive possession
in any context." See
id.
6

dominion and control, and that Mr. Powell had the intent
exercise that control.

to

The record demonstrates that there was

little, if any, evidence to prove that Mr. Powell knew of the
firearm's location in the vehicle so that one could reasonably
infer

beyond

a

reasonable

doubt

that

he

knowingly

and

intentionally possessed the firearm located in Ms. Stewart's fanny
pack, which, in turn, was located inside her back pack.
The only facts tending to prove Mr. Powell's control over the
firearm are the proximity of the back pack and Mr.

Powell's

insistence that the firearm was not loaded when he was informed by
Officer Anderson about the loaded firearm found in the vehicle.
That simply is not enough to establish the requisite nexus between
Mr. Powell and the firearm to permit a reasonable inference that
Mr. Powell knowingly and intentionally possessed the firearm.
Layman,

1999 UT 79 at fl5; Fox,

See

709 P.2d at 318.

All the other evidence in this case lends little or nothing
to the critical factual issue.

At the very least, the other

evidence is inconclusive as to whether Mr. Powell knew or intended
to possess the firearm and, in many instances, the other evidence
supports

the

determination

that

intentionally possess the firearm.

he

did

not

knowingly

or

For example, while the vehicle

was registered in Mr. Powell's name, both Mr. Powell and Ms.
Stewart shared the vehicle (R. 93, p. 39, lines 4-10).
7

In fact,

Ms. Stewart had used the vehicle earlier that day after which she
inadvertently left her back pack in the vehicle (R. 93, p. 41). 3
Many of these facts are made all that more credible by the fact
that Ms. Stewart, at the time of trial, was an adverse witness to
Mr. Powell by virtue of the protective order she had

sought

against him prior to trial (See R. 93, p. 38).
The State argues that Mr. Powell exhibited

incriminating

conduct and made incriminating statements during the investigation
of the vehicle.

See Brief of Appellee, pp. 10-12.

However, Mr.

Powell's conduct, if anything, supports his lack of knowledge
concerning the firearm.

Although the officers allowed Mr. Powell

to return to the vehicle to assist in moving it from the highway,
Mr. Powell made absolutely no effort to remove or conceal the back
pack, which contained the firearm (R. 93, p. 68).

Instead, Mr.

Powell allowed the back pack to remain next to him in the adjacent
passenger seat

(See id.).

Furthermore, in the course of the

investigation, Mr. Powell readily admitted to smoking marijuana a
few days prior to the accident (R. 93, pp. 6-8).

Additionally,

when informed by Officer Anderson that he had found the firearm in
the vehicle, Mr. Powell spontaneously denied ownership of the
firearm and uttered that Ms. Stewart "had put the gun in the car."
3

Ms. Stewart incontrovertibly testified that she owned both the
firearm and the back pack in which the firearm was contained (R. 93,
pp. 39-41) .
8

(See R. 93, pp. 15-16).

Cf.

State

v.

Salas,

820

P.2d 1386, 1389

(Utah Ct. App. 1991) .
Viewing the evidence presented as a whole, no reasonable
inference can be drawn that Mr. Powell knowingly and intentionally
possessed the firearm.
State

v.

Hester,

See

Layman,

1999 UT 79 at fl6; see

2000 UT App 159, ^fl6, 3 P. 3d 725.

also

The firearm

was neither in plain view nor was it easily accessible to Mr.
Powell.

Indeed, there was no circumstantial evidence that Mr.

Powell even knew that the firearm was in the vehicle.

Rather, the

foregoing evidence demonstrates his ignorance that the firearm was
located in the back pack let alone the vehicle.
"An

appellate

insufficient

court

evidence when

should
it

overturn

is apparent

a

conviction

that

there

for

is not

sufficient competent evidence as to each element of the crime
charged for the fact-finder to find, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the defendant committed the crime."

II.

Such is the case here.

THE TRIAL COURT NOT ONLY VIOLATED UTAH RULE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 22(a) WHEN IT SENTENCED MR.
POWELL, BUT IT VIOLATED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS.

The State argues that the trial court did not plainly error
when it sentenced Mr. Powell because it heard from appointed trial
counsel and the State, through appointed counsel.
Appellee, pp. 13-16.

See Brief of

However, the affirmative obligation imposed
9

upon the trial court by Rule 22 (a) and prior case law indicate
otherwise.
In State
granted,

v.

Wanosik,

2001 UT App 241, 31 P.3d 615, cert.

43 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002), the trial court proceeded and

imposed sentence upon the defendant, who was voluntarily
Id.

at Kf4-5.

absent.

The defendant, Mr. Wanosik, appealed, arguing,

among other things, that "the trial court erred by the manner in
Id.

which it conducted sentencing."

at ^[7.

In its analysis of the sentencing procedure, this Court held
that

Utah

Rule

of

Criminal

22(a)4

"imposes

an

affirmative

obligation on the trial court to extend the opportunity to be
heard" and that Rule 22 "does not contemplate the court will
passively wait for counsel to make a request to be heard."
1(32.

Id. at

This Court further stated, "The onus is thus on the trial

court to 'afford7 the defendant and to 'give' the prosecutor the
opportunity to present relevant information."

4

Id.

(citation and

Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states, in
relevant part:
Before imposing sentence the court shall
afford the defendant an opportunity to make a
statement and to present any information in
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal
cause why sentence should not be imposed. The
prosecuting attorney shall also be given an
opportunity to present any information material
to the imposition of sentence.
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a).
10

footnote omitted); see
(Utah 1985)
courts

to

(holding
hear

also

State

v.

Howell,

that predecessor

evidence

from

both

707 P.2d 115, 118

statute
the

"directs

defendant

and

trial
the

prosecution that is relevant to the sentence to be imposed.").
After concluding that the trial court's noncompliance with Rule
22(a) was not harmless, this Court vacated Mr. Wanosik's sentences
and remanded for resentencing.

Wanosik,

2001 UT App 241 at f33.

At sentencing in the instant case, the trial court knew that
Mr. Powell was involuntarily absent (See R. 94, Tab 7, p. 1 ) ; see
also

R. 59-60, Consent to Sentencing in Absentia).

After briefly

discussing Mr. Powell's involuntary absence and the consent to
sentencing in absentia, the trial court immediately proceeded to
impose sentence

(See R. 94, Tab 7, pp. 1-3) .

Contrary to the

State's assertion, however, the trial court, prior to imposing
sentence, failed to illicit from either defense counsel or the
prosecutor "any information in mitigation of punishment" or "any
[other] information material to the imposition of sentence."

See

Utah

the

R.

Crim.

sentencing

P.

hearing

22(a).
did

the

Moreover,
court

at

no

time

reference

the

during

Presentence

Investigation Report, which had been previously prepared for the

11

very

purpose

of

sentencing

(See

R.

73-94,

Presentence

Investigation Report). 5
By not providing

the opportunity

to present

information

material to sentencing, the trial court precluded the presentation
of mitigating circumstances and thus alternative considerations
for sentencing.6

Rather, the trial court proceeded directly to

sentencing without any other consideration.
The plain error analysis of the Wanosik

case is premised upon

the Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of the predecessor statute
to Rule 22(a) in State v.
See Wanosik,
the Wanosik

Howell,

707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985).

2001 UT App 241, f32 & n.12, 31 P.3d 615.

Moreover,

opinion is based, at least in large part, on the plain

5

The State argues that the trial court apparently referred to the
PSI in the course of sentencing.
See Brief of Appellee, p. 16.
Moreover, the State argues that the PSI is not part of the record on
appeal. The State failed to recognize that the PSI is part of the
record and is currently before this Court in State
v. Powell,
Case
No. 20001054-CA, as explicitly set forth in footnote 5 of the Brief
of Appellant. The trial court sentenced Mr. Powell in absentia
on
both cases at the same sentencing hearing on October 17, 2000.
See R. 94, Tab 7 ) . Because of the trial court's obvious confusion
during sentencing concerning the charges upon which the sentence was
based, the trial court had to "redo" the sentence, at which time the
trial court failed to make any reference to the PSI (See R. 94, Tab
7, pp. 2-3).
6

The State mistakenly refers to the request for sentencing by
defense counsel as a joint recommendation of defense counsel and the
prosecution.
See Brief of Appellee, p. 15.
In fact, the record
clearly indicates that the request for sentencing was made only by
Mr. Powell's appointed trial counsel (See R. 94, Tab 7, p, 1, lines
19-22) .
12

language of Rule 22 (a), which places "an affirmative obligation"
upon the trial

court.

Wanosik

Finally, the

holding

is more

applicable to the instant case inasmuch as Mr. Powell, unlike the
defendant in Wanosik,

was involuntarily

absent from sentencing.

CONCLUSION
Based
previously
requests

on

the

foregoing,

submitted

that

this

Brief,7
Court

as well
Daniel

reverse

B.

his

as

that

forth

Powell,
conviction

in

the

respectfully
of

illegal

possession of a handgun and vacate the invalid sentence and remand
the case to the trial court for resentencing and for such other
relief as the Court deems just and appropriate.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of July, 2002.
7IGGINS, P.C.

Appellant

7

Mr. Powell incorporates the arguments set forth in the Brief of
Appellant on the trial court's violation of his constitutional right
to due process in the course of sentencing.
13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to
the following on this 17th day of July, 2002:
Ms. Karen A. Klucznik
Assistant Attorney General
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P.O. Box 140854
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ADDENDUM
No Addendum is necessary pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24(a) (11) .

15

